Lee K. Pennington on Kenneth B. Pyle’s *Hiroshima and the Historians: Debating America’s Most Controversial Decision*

Hiroshima and the Historians by Kenneth B. Pyle, an esteemed specialist in Modern Japanese History at University of Washington (emeritus), presents a thoughtful, multifaceted examination of the iterative processes involved in major discussions, debates, controversies, and conclusions within historiography concerning the decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945 at the end of the Asia-Pacific War (1937-1945).  Written for a general audience, with particular appeal for undergraduate and graduate students of historiography, Pyle’s book is also of interest to scholars of Intellectual History thanks to its well-articulated presentation of conceptual understandings of the decision-making behind the bombings.  Pyle writes with great clarity, adroitly integrating perspectives by multiple historical actors and historians into his well-structured and well-balanced book.

Pyle’s book was designed with scholars in mind: it resulted from decades of coursework that introduced university students to “the historian’s craft” while exploring “the anatomy of the debate” over the decision to drop the bombs and how that conversation has evolved over time.[1]  In Pyle’s words, “Historians have interpreted [the decision] in more divergent ways than perhaps any other event in recent American history,” making the topic intellectually meaningful for all readers no matter their disciplinary approaches to historical inquiry.[2]  Pyle does an efficient job of introducing readers to the basic contours and concerns of modern history-writing as an academic pursuit, a task undertaken while simultaneously providing necessary historical, political, and cultural context for better understanding the significance of the decision both before and after the first weapon fell on Hiroshima on August 6 (followed by the Nagasaki bombing on August 9).  He keeps his examination close to its subject—historians’ interpretation of the decision—without delving too deeply into topics such as the on-the-ground experiences of the bombed, which are studied more extensively elsewhere.  That said, Pyle includes a well-stocked “Suggestions for Further Reading” section (pp. 248-256) that points interested readers to scholarship on other aspects of the bombings.

Following a concise introduction to the book’s overarching goals, Chapter One discusses the ins and outs of how historians write about the past, characterizing ongoing, professional historical analysis as being “fundamental to the health of a democratic society.”[3]  Pyle poses the question “Can the Past Be Known?,” situating it at the center of the importance of being able to defend one’s intellectual conclusions; this existential question returns at the end of the book after Pyle has explored the decision to drop the bombs from various perspectives.[4]  Chapter Two seeks to present as objectively as possible the “facts” behind the atomic bombings, introducing readers to key historical actors and developments to be discussed in later chapters.  Here are the usual suspects from the roll-call of historical factors stretching from the Manhattan Project to the formal surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945.  Pyle then establishes in Chapter Three how the “first draft of history” was shaped by participants in the decision-making process and how first responders ranging from journalists to presidents presented their thoughts on the bombings for public consumption.[5]  As Pyle makes clear, the “orthodox view” of dropping the bombs emerged from these initial steps taken to justify the decision and “influence the way in which history will view [the decision-makers].”[6]

Chapter Four, titled “The Revisionists,” details the emergence of alternative, critical views of the decision by a new generation of scholars; it also defends the importance of revisionism as a key aspect of how historiography works.  The Vietnam War era and its effects on historical inquiry looms large in this chapter, setting the stage for the discussion of historians who positioned the decision in relation to the birth of the Cold War.  Pyle fleshes out the “anatomy of the decision” by providing examples of divergent positions within historiography—Gar Alperovitz and Robert James Maddox to name but two—as well as important developments such as the availability of Soviet sources that informed the “neo-revisionist” work of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa.  The following chapters of Hiroshima and the Historians center on a series of concerns: debates over the morality of the decision (Chapter Five); how scholarship by military historians has transformed views of the decision-making process and its consequences (Chapter Six); and questions about the actions (or lack thereof) of Emperor Hirohito and their effect on the bombings (Chapter Seven).  Sub-topics include the influence of utilitarian thought; whether or not racism played a part in the decision to bomb Japanese cities; and the practice (and pitfalls) of casualty projection undertaken by American decision-makers.  Pyle handles each topic with tact and care, using the works of diverse historians to map out the stakes as he plots his discussions.

Chapter Eight asks readers to consider how temporal framing affects the writing of history: how far back should one go to find the start of a decision, or how close to an event should one’s search for understanding begin?  A major topic in this chapter is historians’ interpretations of the Allied Powers’ demand of unconditional surrender by Japan, which Pyle points out was an atypical way for modern states to end multinational armed conflict.  In Chapter Nine, the book’s conclusion, Pyle wraps up his sketch of the “anatomy of the debate” over the decision to drop the atomic bombs by stating that “It would be hard to find a better example of the essence of the historians’ craft—their “way of life”—than the controversy over the use of the atomic bombs.”[7]  He determines that it is an “argument without end,” but for Pyle this is a strength rather than a failing of how historians have studied the decision to drop the bombs.[8]  “Historical understanding is progressive,” he states.  “It is cumulative.  The more controversy, the better” because “Controversy and argument without end will take us in the direction of truth.”[9]  This reviewer read this final sentence of Pyle’s book as a healthy challenge for historians to embrace rather than a woeful conclusion about the futility of the historian’s craft.  After all, in the spirit of Pyle, ongoing discussion and evaluation of the past from differing perspectives demonstrates the healthy freedom of thought.

If there were a way to expand a component of Pyle’s book, it would involve including more perspectives by historians from Japan.  To be sure, significant Japanese historians and their ideas do appear in Hiroshima and the Historians, such as Asada Sadao, Hatano Sumio, and Iokibe Makoto, thus readers are directed towards Japanese interpretations of the decision to drop the bombs.  Moreover, Pyle notes that American historians with Japanese-language abilities, such as Herbert Bix, have responsibly incorporated the ideas of Japanese scholars within their own work; thus, Pyle does bring attention to contributions made by Japanese scholarship.  It would be useful for readers to be directed to a wider range of scholarship by Japanese historians, but, admittedly, Pyle is writing for many readers who are likely unable to read such materials.  That said, including more work by historians from outside the United States would strengthen Pyle’s observations about the iterative process of history-writing by adding double emphasis to the importance of engaging with the ideas of historians from other places.  A useful book in this regard that complements Pyle’s discussion of Japanese perspectives is Japan and the World, 1853-1952: A Bibliographic Guide to Japanese Scholarship in Foreign Relations (Columbia University Press, 1989), edited by Asada Sadao.  Although a bit dated from the point of time of the writing of this review, chapters in that volume present the views of scholars from Japan and point to examples of their writings, with the caveat that most of that scholarship—but not all of it—is written in Japanese.

In closing, readers will gain much by engaging with Hiroshima and the Historians and its focus on the atomic bombing decision as a case study of how generations of historians interpret and re-interpret the past.  In full disclosure, a few months prior to being approached to write this review, its author assigned Hiroshima and the Historians for his Spring 2025 capstone seminar on historiography for 1/C Midshipmen (undergraduate senior-year students) at the United States Naval Academy, a course that serves as a culminating experience for the 3-year-long History Major offered at Annapolis.  Pyle’s book worked exceedingly well in a course for students with diverse interests in history that ran the gamut from the social history of the American West to international humanitarian aid during the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949).  No matter their corner of the past, students—all future U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officers—praised the book for expanding their understanding of historiography and encouraging critical review of factors that influenced the decision to drop the atomic bombs.  Based on my professional experience using Pyle’s book in the classroom, this reviewer enthusiastically endorses Hiroshima and the Historians for not only university-level students of history but also readers from all perspectives and academic fields who seek to better appreciate the thinking that shapes the historian’s craft.

[1] Kenneth B. Pyle, Hiroshima and the Historians: Debating America’s Most Controversial Decision (Cambridge University Press, 2024), 15, 14.

[2] Ibid., 239.

[3] Ibid., 20.

[4] Ibid., 27.

[5] Ibid., 61.

[6] Ibid., 62.

[7] Ibid., 240.

[8] Ibid., 241.

[9] Ibid., 243, 247.