Robert P. Watson on Osamah F. Khalil’s *A World of Enemies: America’s Wars at Home and Abroad from Kennedy to Biden *

In this timely, thorough, and quite readable book, Osamah F. Khalil, an associate professor of history at Syracuse and frequent media commentator, reexamines a topic that has rightly attracted much attention in recent years; that is, the use and extension of US military power in modern times. Yet, with a critical eye, a wide array of detailed examples, and stark political insights, Khalil brings fresh insights and perspectives to the problem.

Khalil’s starting point is, not surprisingly, the shift in thinking about the world and the use of the military under Presidents John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon. This new paradigm of US militarization became ensconced in the fabric of policymaking and international relations during the 1970s and was not only the focus but the driving element of the agendas of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.

One of the many important themes in A World of Enemies is how this militarized mindset also came to dominate domestic issues. The author uses an example of how some presidents and their advisors came to view difficult and problem places as “badlands.” (1) Here, Khalil borrows a headline from a Philadelphia newspaper and the ensuing political debate about a blighted neighborhood plagued by street crack, cash, and violence. Political leaders and ultimately much of the public began to see such problems much like the simplistic depiction in such influential films as Scarface in 1983 or New Jack City in 1991. Urban riots and racial unrest were such that they necessitated a militarized response.

Such ideas were mainstreamed and resulted in an array of new policy “solutions,” as can be seen in the global war on drugs, which was followed by the global war on terror. Such “badlands” include troubled spots around the world—such Central American “drug lands” and Middle Eastern “terror lands.” Such places constituted a new threat to both the US and the “civilized” world. Beginning with Nixon, a new “law and order” approach to both domestic and foreign policy replaced more traditional elements of diplomacy and social policy. Often these responses were tinged with “racial and cultural” factors, such as seeing the “Arab community in general” as promoting terror. (2)

Khalil uses the analogy of the United States as “firemen,” in that “whenever and wherever a fire breaks out… our firemen rush in, wheeling up all their heavy equipment, and resorting to every known method of containing and extinguishing the blaze.” Such metaphors and analysis of US foreign policy are not new, but the author successfully traces the roots of such policy decisions to this new mindset. He also analyzes that, too often, US intelligence agencies were “setting the fires, rather than extinguishing them.” (3)

One of the many byproducts of the “world of enemies” mindset is that it “broke down the walls separating law enforcement from military operations.” Another theme explored in the book is that this phenomenon has occurred in both domestic policy and foreign policy. Here, Khalil takes a deep dive into Reagan’s claims of the nation’s “decline” both “at home and abroad” and also his promise of “American renewal.” This can be seen in his policies toward Afghanistan, the war on drugs, and in much of his administration’s agenda. Khalil notes that Reagan’s “aggressive policies in the Third World and renewed tensions with Moscow were matched in the domestic sphere.” This mindset by Reagan can easily be seen in the agendas set by the second Bush and Donald Trump. (4)

The book devotes ample attention to exploring Reagan’s reliance on covert actions, whether in Honduras or Nicaragua, or as was seen in the infamous Iran-Contra scandal. The United States had come to embrace the use of paramilitary solutions in a host of situations, including in Nicaragua, Iran, Cuba, Libya, and Syria. Khalil also reveals the administration’s thinking about NSDD 138, for instance, a directive authorizing, among other things, a wide range of actions including military raids, sabotage, and the neutralization of individuals and groups. All of this, Khalil notes, “blurred the line between actions against state and nonstate actors.” This reality is yet another important change in US foreign policy highlighted in the book. (5)

Khalil’s arguments are based on concerns among US political leaders of the nation’s waning political influence and power around the world. Yet, much of the corresponding promotion of a militarized agenda, both at home and abroad, stems, he points out, from the failure in Vietnam. At the same time, he maintains that there is also the reality and perception that political solutions are often not feasible or are extremely difficult in a complex, dynamic world. Of course, one of the problems is that the militarized policies that replaced other approached have rarely worked. Accordingly, Khalil ends with an argument for rethinking this reliance on militarization in US domestic and foreign policy, while reinvesting in the tools of traditional diplomacy and prioritizing new approaches.

In all, this is an impressive book that contributes to our understanding of the failures of US policymaking in dealing with some large and vital issues over the past half century. Khalil cautions us against a continuation of such militarized mindsets. The book is written in a way that should appeal to both scholars of security studies and international affairs as well as a wider, general readership.

1. Khalil 2024, 141-144.
2. Khalil, 2024, 59.
3. Khalil, 2024, 8.
4. Khalil, 2024, 99.
5. Khalil, 2024, 120.