“Classifying Pseudoscience”: Sven Ove Hansson on Michael D. Gordin’s *On the Fringe: Where Science Meets Pseudoscience*

There is no lack of books offering a broad perspective on pseudoscience. Can a new overview add something important? Yes, Michael Gordin’s book adds at least two important aspects to the literature. First, as a historian, he puts some of the pseudosciences in a historical perspective that is seldom presented. Secondly, he contributes to the systematic treatment of pseudosciences by introducing four groups of such teachings. As he himself emphasises, these categories are overlapping and non-exhaustive, but they are nevertheless helpful for the clarification of both the similarities and the differences between different deviant doctrines.

Gordin has chosen to focus on doctrines that concern the natural sciences, and exclude the humanities and social sciences. This is unfortunate, since it would have been interesting to read his comments as a historian on pseudoarchaeology, historical negationism and falsified historiography. Furthermore, he excludes false medical claims from his topic. This exclusion is based on a misunderstanding. He rightly points out that the efficacy of treatments is a central criterion in medicine, but he then incorrectly asserts that contrary to claims in natural science, claims of treatment efficacy are judged according to “a nonepistemological standard” (p. viii). To the contrary, the extent to which a treatment has specific effects (such as therapeutic effects) is something that can be known in the same way as other scientific truth-claims. In medical science, claims about therapeutic efficacy are evaluated with rigorous scientific methods such as clinical trials.

Vestigial science

The first of Gordin’s four categories of pseudoscience consists of the vestigial sciences, which are doctrines or practices that were once parts of science, but have been rejected after being shown to be “too simplistic, or underdeveloped, or plain false” (p. 15). This is an important category. Putting focus on it contributes to clarifying that scientific knowledge is always provisional and susceptible to change or rejection in the light of new evidence. Gordin rightly mentions astrology and alchemy as examples of vestigial sciences. Based on recent historical research, he shows how closely alchemy was once knit to what we today call chemistry.

Another of his examples is more problematic. In 2006, the International Astronomical Union reclassified Pluto, previously called a planet, a “dwarf planet.” Gordin uses this as an example of how “cutting edge” science can become “irrelevant or wrong” (p. 15). However, this was only a change in terminology, not a refutation of previous claims about Pluto. It can be compared to the (much more gradual) decision by mathematicians not to include the number 1 among the prime numbers. This was a change of the definition, not the result of new discoveries about the number 1.[1]

Gordin makes the bold claim that “[m]ost pseudosciences are vestigial” (p. 27). He supports this claim with only a handful of examples. It is not difficult to come up with a long list of pseudosciences whose central claims have never been supported by science (homeopathy, ufology, the Bermuda triangle, ley lines, mesmerism, biorhythms, earcandling, hexagonal water, iridology, holocaust denial, facilitated communication, phrenology, etc.). Since it is difficult to individuate pseudosciences, and impossible to make a complete list of them, it would seem reasonable to refrain from making statements about the relative numerosity of vestigial and non-vestigial pseudosciences.

Hyperpoliticized pseudoscience

The second category is hyperpoliticized pseudoscience. Typical examples can be found in Nazi Germany (racist anthropology, so-called German physics) and the Soviet Union (Lysenkoism, Soviet historiography). However, Gordin points out that such distortions of science can also take place in democracies. Furthermore, he maintains that “[a]ll science is at least potentially political, whether on the smaller-scale dimension of hierarchies and prestige within a discipline, or on the broader stage as the recipient of government funds and mobilized to project an (often benign or even salutary) vision of a country as being ‘pro-science’” (pp. 29-30). Here he draws attention to a definitional problem: some forms of political involvement in science are presumably benign. Where do we draw the limit between benign political involvement and the hyperpoliticization that gives rise to pseudoscience? Gordin does not say much about this, but he points out that hyperpoliticization makes the affected sciences function “purely as arms of a particular political ideology” (p. 30).

At this point, he could have made use of a well-known distinction from the discussion on values in science. It is generally recognized among philosophers of science that non-epistemic values influence science in many ways. For instance, values have impact on the distribution of funding between research areas and on what experiments on human subjects are accepted. However, one type of value influence is considered to be much more problematic than the others, namely influence on what claims are taken to be (provisional) scientific knowledge.[2] Similarly, a demarcation of hyperpoliticization could focus on political influence on what claims are accepted as scientific knowledge.

Counterestablishment pseudoscience

The third category is counterstablishment pseudoscience. It is characterized by the belief that “the establishment is corrupting or blocking the truth, and therefore the defenders of the real science—the demonized so-called pseudoscience—need to adapt their tactics to fight the establishment” (pp. 42-43). Prominent examples of such beliefs can be found in creationism, cosmic catastrophism, homeopathy, ufology, anti-vaccinationism and climate science denial. As Gordin points out, counterestablishment pseudoscience often mimics the organizational structures of mainstream science. For instance, creationists have institutes, conferences, journals, book series, and degree programs. To this can be added that counterestablishment pseudoscience is often closely connected with conspiracy theories. If all vaccines are dangerous, then it seems necessary to invoke some kind of conspiracy to explain why immunologists and clinical experts in infectious diseases virtually unanimously promote vaccination as beneficial for health. Similarly, if there is no anthropogenic climate change, then the consensus among climate scientists on the reality of anthropogenic climate change does not seem explainable without resort to a conspiracy theory.

Mindpower pseudoscience

The fourth category consists of studies of extrasensory perception and other alleged phenomena involving “powers of mind that extend beyond the canonically recognized five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch” (pp. 59-60). This includes parapsychology as well as older movements such as mesmerism and spiritualism. Gordin does not have a name for this group, but we can call them mindpower pseudosciences.

Gordin’s treatment of parapsychology is characterized by a too high respect for J.B. Rhine’s (1895-1980) card-guessing experiments, which were much in vogue about sixty years ago. A reader of Rhine’s books may get the impression that he applied meticulous controls and introduced what Gordin calls “refinement of methodology” (p. 68), but later research has shown that this was not at all the case. Careful analysis of the evidence has revealed that his subjects had ample opportunities and monetary incentives to obtain “paranormal” results by cheating.[3] Rhine’s “evidence” of extrasensory perception has never been replicated under controlled circumstances.

Skepticism against demarcation

Gordin is sceptical against the possibility of a general criterion for the demarcation of science against pseudoscience. A major reason for this is that in his view, “[a]ll demarcation criteria” are “built inductively out of specific cases, and therefore cannot hope to cover the whole waterfront of possibilities” (p. 14). As far as I can see, this generalization is simply not true. For instance, I cannot see how the demarcation criterion I have myself proposed can be described as built inductively out of special cases. (According to that criterion, a statement is pseudoscientific if and only if it (1) pertains to an issue within the domains of science in the broad sense, (2) suffers from such a severe lack of reliability that it cannot at all be trusted, and (3) is part of a doctrine whose major proponents try to create the impression that it represents the most reliable knowledge on its subject matter.[4])

Some of Gordin’s statements about the situation in science are problematic. For instance, he says:

Demarcation is built into our funding systems. Applicants need to present their own work as superior to those of wrong-headed competitors, and the panels that evaluate the grants must always reject a large number of proposals as less worthy than the few they endorse. Limited funds set up a ruthless machine for discarding scientific claims, some of which might end up on the fringe. (p. 78)

In order to obtain funding from prestigious funding agencies such as the NSF and the corresponding bodies in Western Europe, applicants have to satisfy much higher demands of scientific quality than to avoid being pseudoscientific. At least in my experience, the demarcation against pseudoscience is only very seldom relevant in funding decisions. Furthermore:

The pressures in scientific research are to do something new, and that usually means refuting a tenet of contemporary science. (p. 77)

In science, “something new” need not be a refutation of what was believed previously. It can also be a discovery that extends knowledge to areas not covered by previous investigations. Gordin presents no evidence for the claim that most new discoveries contradict previously held beliefs.

Finally, he argues that with few exceptions, pseudoscience is harmless:

Understanding more of the processes at work in the creation of the fringe, and its heterogeneity, helps us grapple with those few movements that can cause significant public harm. The rest we might treat as a vibrant, but mostly unthreatening, phenomenon of contemporary culture. (p. 101)

He offers no example of a harmless pseudoscience. It is indeed difficult to find such examples, and much easier to find examples of pseudosciences that can be harmful. Belief in inefficient therapies can delay or preclude adequate medical treatment. Creationism and other fallacious views on the workings of nature can stand in the way of the scientific literacy we all need as citizens. Belief in historical myths, such as 9/11 conspiracy theories, can make a person more willing to believe in other, more ominous conspiracy theories. The movements that can cause significant public harm may not be so few, after all.

[1] Chris K. Caldwell, Angela Reddick, and Yeng Xiong, “The History of the Primality of One: A Selection of Sources,” Journal of Integer Sequences, vol. 15 (2012), article 12.9.8.

[2] Sven Ove Hansson, 2017 “How values can influence science without threatening its integrity,” in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science – Proceedings of the 15th International Congress, Eds. Hannes Leitgeb, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Päivi Seppälä and Elliott Sober (Rickmansworth: College Publications, 2017), pp. 207-221.

[3] C. E. M. Hansel,  ESP and Parapsychology: A Critical Re-evaluation. (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1980), esp. pp. 85-123.

[4] Sven Ove Hansson, “Defining pseudoscience – and science”. in The Philosophy of Pseudoscience, Ed. Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), pp. 61-77, esp. pp. 70-71.